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'TIL SUCCESS DO US PART: HOW
ILLINOIS PROMOTES INEQUITIES IN
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
PURSUANT TO DIVORCE BY
EXCLUDING PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL
INTRODUCTION
A vast majority of states revised their divorce laws between
1972 and 1983.1 In doing so, thirty-eight of the fifty States adopted
2
Such statutes treat marriage as a
equitable distribution statutes.
3
partnership. Consequently, marital dissolution resembles partner-

ship dissolution. 4 Upon divorce, each spouse has an equal claim to
5
property acquired during the marriage. If property acquired during the marriage includes a business interest, the partnership the6
ory envisions a distribution of that business interest upon divorce.

1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
triggered massive divorce reform by promulgating a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1971. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 101, Prefatory Note,
9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) [hereinafter Prefatory Note]. The 1973 amendments to
the property disposition section of the Uniform Act provided alternative provisions applicable to either community property or equitable distribution systems
to facilitate its adoption nationwide. Id. By the middle of 1983, 38 jurisdictions
had adopted some form of equitable distribution provisions of the Uniform Act.
Carmen Valle Patel, Note, Treating ProfessionalGoodwill as MaritalProperty
in Equitable DistributionStates, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 557 (1983). These jurisdictions included Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Washington D.C., Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 557 n.21.
2. See Patel, supra note 1, listing 38 jurisdictions that adopted equitable
distribution between 1972 and 1983. See also Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B.
Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 24 FAM. L.Q. 309, 336-37
(1991) (listing 49 states, plus the District of Columbia, as equitable distribution
jurisdictions as of 1991, adding Florida, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia to the list since 1983).
3. Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 149. "The distribution of property upon
the termination of marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the
distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. In re Marriage of Leon, 399 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (discussing the majority of jurisdictions agreeing that marital property includes an
interest of a spouse in a partnership business). See also In re Marriage of White,
424 N.E.2d 421, 422-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that business interests acquired subsequent to the marriage, such as a sole proprietorship, or stock in a
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The Illinois General Assembly adopted equitable distribution
in 1977 with the enactment of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (the "Illinois Dissolution Act"). 7 In enacting the
Illinois Dissolution Act, the legislature intended to correct glaring
8
inequities in property distribution that existed under the prior law.
Additionally, the legislature strived for finality of the parties' relationship by distributing all marital property 9 and avoiding modifiable future payments.10
Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the legislature's goals in adopting the Illinois Dissolution Act. In the recent decision in In re Marriage of Zells," the Illinois Supreme
Court created formidable inequities in holding that a business interest is not marital property subject to distribution if it consists of
professional goodwill. 12 Professional goodwill is an identifiable part
of a professional's business that can have significant value. 13 The
effect of Zells is that courts will ignore a valuable asset acquired
during the marriage, resulting in inequitable property distributions
pursuant to divorce.
closely held corporation, are considered marital property); see generally In re
Marriage of Lee, 398 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (upholding the district
court's order regarding two businesses owned by the couple, which distributed
one business to each spouse).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 101-801 (1991) [hereinafter Illinois Dissolution Act]. Paragraph 503 of the Illinois Dissolution Act regulates the disposition
of property pursuant to divorce, and is based on the Uniform Act, as originally
promulgated in 1971. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 503 (1991). See also Prefatory
Note, supra note 1, at 240 (providing the property disposition provision of the
Uniform Act in its pre-1973 form); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382,
1386-87 (Ill. 1978) (stating that the legislative purpose behind Illinois' adoption
of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was to provide for the equitable distribution of property upon divorce).
8. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d at 1388. Justice Moran of the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized in Kujawinski that in adopting the Illinois Dissolution Act,
"[tihe primary legislative objective is to create a system of property division
upon dissolution of marriage that is more equitable than that which previously
existed in this State. It is evident that the legislature recognized glaring inequities in the earlier law and favored change." Id.
9. Lee, 398 N.E.2d at 133. A court strives for an equitable division of the
marital property acquired during the marriage to enable the parties to begin
anew. Id. See also Max Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 413, 418 (1976) (pointing out that there is a trend in this country towards the abandonment of the view of marriage as a lifetime commitment, and
the desire to treat divorce as a final and complete termination of a relationship
enabling the parties to begin new families).
10. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 425. The insufficiency of alimony combined
with the growing acceptance of spouses as equals creates a demand for equal
sharing of property at divorce. Id.
11. In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. 1991).
12. Id. at 946.
13. See infra notes 115-145 and accompanying text for a detailed explanation of professional goodwill.
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This Note discusses the inequities created by failing to value
professional goodwill as property subject to distribution upon divorce. Part I of this Note provides a general background of marital
dissolution law, first with respect to the changing role of marriage
in society, and second with respect to the three systems that provide
the foundation for dissolution law in America. Next, Part II generally discusses the treatment in marital dissolution of business goodwill. Part III then focuses specifically on the courts' treatment of
professional goodwill. Part III first discusses the treatment of professional goodwill under the majority and minority views nationwide, and then discusses the treatment of professional goodwill by
Illinois courts before Zells. Next, Part IV analyzes the Zells case
and the inequitable effect it will have on property distributions in
the future. Finally, Part V proposes an amendment to the Illinois
Dissolution Act that provides a method of valuation for professional
goodwill that will yield an equitable result consistent with the legislative intent underlying the Act.
I.

PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IN MARITAL DISSOLUTION

The evolution of dissolution law in America reflects society's
changing attitude about marriage. 14 Three different "systems" exist today as a result of the differing regional attitudes about marriage nationwide. 15 Each state adopted one of these systems as the
basis for their dissolution laws. This section first discusses dissolution law as it is affected by the changing role of marriage in society.
Second, this section explains the three "systems" of American dissolution law.
A. "Your Fault" to No-Fault: Divorce as Shaped
by the Role of Marriagein Society
The history of divorce laws reflects societies' changing attitudes
about marriage.16 In Western societies, marriage served an important economic function. 17 It reflected the expectations of the roles
14. See ittfra notes 16-41 for a discussion of how society's changing attitudes
have effected dissolution law.
15. See infra notes 42-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
three American systems on which the states base their dissolution laws.
16. Bea Ann Smith, The PartnershipTheory of Marriage:A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEx. L. REV. 689, 694-95 (1990); Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property at
Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1989). The way in which society perceives marriage
shapes the manner in which the laws treat divorce. Id. Such societal attitudes
are employed by courts to formulate the factors they consider in determining
property distribution pursuant to divorce. Id. Furthermore, since the actors in
the divorce process, such as lawyers, judges and spouses, are part of society,
their attitudes shape the manner in which they consider the fairness of factors
under consideration in property distribution. Id.
17. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 413.
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of husbands and wives in a patriarchal society.'8 Men were legally
responsible for protecting and providing for their wives, while
wives were responsible for taking care of the home and children. 19
Thus, marital roles defined the responsibilities of the parties and
allocated the support and property acquisition functions to the
20
husband.
After the Industrial Revolution, it was more common for wives
to work outside the home.2 1 The insufficiency of husbands' earnings required that wives work "to make ends meet, ' 22 however, employers paid very low wages to women. 23 Therefore, marriage
retained its economic function because women remained primarily
dependent on their husbands for support. 24 Moreover, even though
wives began to contribute support and property, severe legal restrictions limited the control they could exercise over their own earnings and property. 25 These restrictions contributed to the need for
laws addressing the property rights of spouses upon the termination
26
of a marriage.
18. Id.
19. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 413-14 n.4. In France, "[t]he husband owes
protection to his wife, the wife owes obedience to the husband." Id. (quoting
French C. Civ. Art. 213 (1804)). Whereas in Italy, "[t]he husband is the head of
the family." Id. (quoting Ital. C.C. Art. 131 (1865)).
20. Smith, supra note 16, at 694-95.
21. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 414. "With the onset of the industrial
revolution, pure housewife marriage was an inaccurate description of the family
life." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 414. Nineteenth century society viewed
women as economic dependents of their husbands. Id. See also Mary E.
O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practicein Search of a Theory, 23 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 437, 459-60 (1988). Indeed, it was culturally desirable for a woman
to remain at home and refrain from working. Id. If a wife worked outside the
home, the presumption was that the family had not yet achieved middle-class
status. Id.
25. See Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 416. Until well after the Industrial
Revolution began, husbands solely managed and controlled property. Id. This
was even true of property owned by the wife separately before the marriage. Id.
Additionally, it included property acquired by gift or inheritance during the
marriage. Id. Further, the husband had a legal right to use and dispose of all of
the property in the marriage, including his wife's earnings. Id. See generally
William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution of American Community
Property Law and Their Import to Equitable DistributionStates, 23 FAM. L.Q.
163, 166-67 (1989) (discussing the importance of the Middle Age's concept of
passing land along the male bloodline as impacting women's property rights in
marriage).
26. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights cf Passage: Divorce Law in
HistoricalPerspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 655 (198.). It was not until 1839 that
Mississippi passed the first of the Married Women's Property Acts. Id. This
entitled married women to have title and control over their own property and
earnings. Id. With the turn of the twentieth century came a time when a
number of countries granted women the legal right to full control over their
earnings. Id. See also Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 415 (stating that some coun-
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In 1785, Pennsylvania responded to this need and passed the
first law permitting courts to grant divorces and thus determine
property rights.27 In reflecting society's social and moral values,
the judicial divorce laws began as an adversary system based on
fault.28 The fault system reflected society's belief that marriage
tries granted women unrestricted rights over their earnings, including Germany in 1896, Switzerland in 1908, and France in 1907).
27. Friedman, supra note 26, at 655. Until the end of the 18th century, divorce was solely within the power of the legislature. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-82 (1973) [hereinafter HISTORY]. The process
was cumbersome, to put it mildly. Id. Consequently, divorces were rarely
granted. Id. Thus, desertion was the commonplace means of terminating a
marital relationship. Friedman, supra note 26, at 655. This was troublesome,
particularly for women, because property rights were left in limbo. Id. See e.g.
O'Connell, supra note 24, at 462 (stating that the English common law regarding property, which carried over to American Law, created legal disabilities on
women).
In colonial times, legislative divorces were rare, though cumbersome.
Friedman, supra note 26, at 655. Virginia granted one such divorce to Mary and
William Cloud. Id. at 652. This law states that their marriage "is hereby dissolved, the said Mary forever divorced from her husband.., and the power and
authority of the said William over the person and property of the said Mary,
shall henceforth cease and determine." Id. at 652 n.10 (quoting 1839 Laws Va.,
ch. 262).
These legislative divorces are better understood when viewed in a historical
context. Id. at 653. This was also an era when the legislature chartered corporations individually, changed people's names, and handled the affairs of individual
communities on an individual basis. Id. However, as demand increased, legislatures could not handle the load. Id. at 652. Increasingly, they spent more and
more time passing laws for private individuals. Id. at 652-53. Consequently,
lawmakers enacted laws providing for judicial divorce in response to the legal
problems surrounding property and inheritance. Friedman, supra note 24, at
655.
Pennsylvania led the way in 1785 by enacting its first law providing for
court decreed divorce. HISTORY, supra at 182. Other states soon followed,
although the northern states were quicker to adopt judicial divorce than the
more parochial southern states. Friedman, supra note 26, at 652. It was not
until 1897 that all the states eliminated legislative divorce. Id. at 655. In that
year Delaware granted 102 legislative divorces. Id.
28. Friedman, supra note 26, at 653. The first divorce laws reflected moral
goals in their respective lists of "grounds." Id. In 1822, Rhode Island granted a
divorce for "impotency, adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion for five
years... [or] neglect or refusal.., of the husband, being of sufficient ability, to
provide necessaries for the subsistence of his wife." Id. at 654 (quoting REV.
STATS. R.I., 368-69 (1822)). The Rhode Island law concluded with a broad provision allowing divorce for "any other gross misbehavior and wickedness ... repugnant to or in violation of the marriage covenant." Id. (quoting REV. STATS.
R.I., 368-69 (1822)). Additionally, the divorce laws reflected the societal attitude
that marital misconduct warranted punishment. See also Rheinstein, supra
note 9, at 415. The laws punished a husband shown to be unbearably cruel, or
particularly indiscrete as an adulterer by depriving him of the companionship
and household services of his wife. Id. Moreover, the guilty husband remained
responsible for the wife's support. Id. At the same time, punishment for a wife
who strayed from the marital bed, even once, or was intolerable in any way, was
equally severe. Id. She was punished with a divorce accompanied by the complete deprivation of home and support. Id. See generally Lenore J. Weitzman,
The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1185 (1981) (stating
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was a life-long guarantee of a wife's source of property and support.29 Divorce was difficult to obtain.30 Thus, a husband could not
easily leave, taking property and terminating the support
31
obligation.
As marital roles and societal attitudes changed, so too did the
laws regarding marital dissolution.3 2 Marriage gradually evolved
from a relationship motivated predominantly by economics, to one
in which people sought love and affection. 3 As the stigma of divorce diminished, spouses manipulated the fault system by perjur34
ing themselves or colluding to obtain a consensual divorce.
Consequently, over the past twenty years, legislators recognized the
need for change and enacted laws for marital dissolution that took
on a no-fault aura. 35 Obtaining a divorce became easier, and the
that the economic consequences of divorce were directly linked to the "guilt" or
"innocence" of the respective spouses).
29. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 415; Friedman, supra note 26, at 652. Originally, the laws provided for two different types of divorce. Rheinstein, supra
note 9, at 415. The first type was similar to today's version of a legal separation
because spouses remained married, but lived apart and were prohibited from
ever remarrying. Id. The second type of divorce was an absolute divorce, as we
know it today. Id. However, the court had the discretion to allow only the innocent spouse the right to remarry. Id. Alternatively, the guilty spouse might
merely be required to wait a longer period of time before remarrying. Id.
30. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 415. See also, Friedman, supra note 26, at
653 (stating that divorce statutes were not at all simple, facilitative laws); Jane
Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality,58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 539, 541 (1990)(stating that a wife, who was not guilty of marital misconduct, could prevent a guilty husband from obtaining a divorce if the wife was
unhappy with the financial settlement).
31. Rutheford, supra note 30, at 541.
32. Smith, supra note 16, at 694-95.
33. Friedman, supra note 26, at 657-58. People now have high expectations
of marriage. Id. They require spouses to be friends, lovers, companions, and
equals. Id.
34. Friedman, supra note 26, at 659. In New York, where the only ground
for divorce was adultery, collusive behavior was particularly wide-spread. Id.
Proof of adultery was required. Id. Consequently, there were people who would
arrange adulterous scenes in hotel rooms for a fee. Id. The women hired for
this purpose would testify to the existence of an adulterous relationship in
court. Id. These people were sometimes raided and exposed. Id. In 1900, Henry
Zeimer and Waldo Maison were arrested for operating such a business. Id. Herbert F. Miller's exposure came in the early 1920's. Id. Additionally, the New
York Times reported a crack down on Jack Berkowitz's divorce ring in 1922. Id.
Mr. Berkowitz's ring was staffed by actors in financial need waiting for their big
breaks on Broadway. Id. Similar crack downs continued until as recently as
1948. Id.
As an alternative to collusion, some people went to other jurisdictions to
avoid strict divorce laws. Id. at 661. Mexico and the Virgin Islands were popular, yet somewhat questionable legally. Id. at 662. On the legally safer side,
North Dakota, South Dakota and Indiana attracted people seeking lenient divorce laws. Id. Additionally, Nevada divorces became popular for the rich as far
back as 1906. Id.
35. Weitzman, supra note 28, at 1184-85. California became the first state to
pass a no-fault statute in 1969. Id.

See also Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 416. By
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resulting consequences became far less severe. 36
Moreover, twentieth-century society abandoned the notion of
marriage as a promise of never-ending financial support. 37 Women
became property owners with full legal capacity and were no longer

dependent upon men to acquire and retain property. 38

Further,

dual-career households became increasingly more common and
thus women were able to support themselves. 39 Now, marriage is
viewed more as a partnership between legal equals, under which
spouses have equal claims to property acquired during the mar1976, "no-fault divorce has become available in the Nordic countries, the socialist countries, the Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Portugal, France, Japan, England, Australia, Canada, [and] several Latin American
countries." Id. Additionally, of the 53 United States jurisdictions, 47 adopted
some form of no-fault divorce. Id. People began viewing divorce less as the
result of fault, and more as the result of disappointed expectations. Id. See also
Rutherford, supra note 30, at 542 (stating that as of 1990, all fifty states had a
form of no-fault divorce).
36. Weitzman, supra note 28, at 1185. Divorce laws based on fault became
outmoded and produced unworkable results. Id. Divorce reformers sought to
create more rational, fair settlements not based on fault. Id. See also Rutherford, supra note 27, at 542. See generally Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B.
Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367-526
(1989) for a categorization of divorce laws in the United States by state. Many
no-fault statutes are based on a ground of irreconcilable differences. Id. at 38586. An example of one such statute is The Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7
at 401(a). The statute grants a divorce on irreconcilable differences as follows:
(2) That the spouses have lived separate and apart for a continuous period
in excess of 2 years and irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and the court determines that efforts at
reconciliation have failed or that future attempts at reconciliation would be
impracticable and not in the best interests of the family; provided that if
the spouses have lived separate and apart for a continuous period of not less
than 6 months next preceding the entry of the judgment dissolving the
marriage, as evidenced by testimony or affidavits of the spouses, the requirement herein of living separate and apart for a continuous period in
excess of 2 years may be waived upon written stipulation of both spouses
filed with the court."
Id.
See also Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 149.
The Conference came finally to the conclusion .. that the legal dissolution
of a marriage should be based solely on a finding that factually the marriage is irretrievably broken. This standard will redirect the law's attention
from an unproductive assignment of blame to a search for the realities of
the marital situation."
Id.
37. Smith, supra note 16, at 695. Society's changed views of marriage resulted in an attempt to provide divorce laws that substituted equitable property
distributions for the abandoned promise of neverending financial support. Id.
"In contrast, today spouses are fired when they lose their charm, children have
no guarantee of care, and spouses often refuse to continue supporting their families." Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 698-703 (discussing the evolution of women's legal rights
regarding property and its effect on divorce laws).
39. Id. at 695.
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riage. 40 As in the past, the current societal view of marriage has
influenced the manner in which property is distributed in divorce
41

proceedings.

B.

Yours, Mine and Ours - Property Distribution
in Marital Dissolution

The manner in which courts distribute property and award
maintenance upon marital dissolution depends on the "system"
adopted by the jurisdiction. 42 Today, three such systems exist; com43
mon law title, community property, and equitable distribution.
Although most states originally based their dissolution laws on a
system of common law title, all but one state was under a system of
equitable distribution by 1991. 4 4

This section describes the three

systems on which states base their dissolution laws.
1.

Common Law Title
In a common law title jurisdiction, the court distributes prop-

erty to the party in the name in which title is held.45 An economi-

cally dependent spouse is generally entitled to some form of
permanent alimony when that spouse's share of distributed property is insufficient to provide for self-support. 46 In addition, the
court has some power to modify the property distribution by way of
48
special equities 47 or alimony in gross.
40. Robert J. Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-PropertyIssues, 23 FAM.
L.Q. 147, 152 (1989) (stating that the goal of the new divorce laws is to treat
spouses like partners).
41. Id.
42. Joseph W. McKnight, Defining PropertySubject to Division at Divorce,
23 FAM. L.Q. 193, 194-95 (1989).
43. Id.
44. See Patel, supra note 1, for a listing of the forty-nine states that adopted
equitable distribution laws by 1991.
45. Marshall J. Auerbach, An Introduction to the New Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of MarriageAct, 66 ILL. B.J. 132 (1977).
46. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 424.
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 18 (1975) (repealed 1977). The former law
providing for special equities provided that "[w]henever a divorce is granted, if
it shall appear to the court that either party holds the title to property equitably
belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance thereof to be made to
the party entitled to the same, upon such terms as it shall deem equitable." Id.
The concept of special equities permits a court to redistribute property owned
by one spouse to the other. See id. In order to do so, the nontitled spouse must
trace some form of financial contribution directly to the acquisition or improvement of the property. Everett v. Everett, 185 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962).
In Everett, the court traced the wife's contributions of cash in both the down
payment of the home that was sold, and in construction of the new house to
create equitable ownership in the new house. Id. Alternatively, the nontitled
spouse must show an indirect contribution of services, over and above normal
marital services, to acquire equitable ownership. Id. However, such direct or
indirect contributions are often difficult to prove. Id.
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Nevertheless, common law title, which was the formerly predominant system, received much criticism because of its discrimination against a dependent spouse. 49 Since a dependent spouse did not
work outside the home, there was little or no opportunity to acquire
title to property. 50 The supporting spouse was the principal titleholder to all the property s ' and consequently received the property
upon the dissolution of the marriage. 52 Nevertheless, the dependent spouse still contributed to the family, albeit in a nonfinancial
way. 53 The courts, however, ignored the contributions of the dependent spouse upon divorce.54
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 19 (1975)(repealed 1977). The former law
provided for alimony in gross as follows:
The court may order the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay to the
other party such sum of money, or convey to the party such real or personal
property, payable or to be conveyed either in gross or by installments as
settlement in lieu of alimony, as the court deems equitable."
Id.
Thus, alimony in gross is an award of alimony to be paid in a lump sum, rather
than in periodic payments. See Green v. Green, 354 N.E.2d 661, 669-70 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976); Overton v. Overton, 287 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
To award alimony in gross, the court can redistribute property owned by
one spouse for the support of the nontitleholding spouse. Persico v. Persico, 100
N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ill. 1951). Accordingly, the requesting spouse must first be
entitled to alimony. Id Moreover, there must be compelling reasons why periodic payments cannot be made. Green, 354 N.E.2d at 669-70. Under a common
law title system, courts preferred periodic alimony payments. Id. However,
where the record showed that periodic payments were not feasible, the court
could award alimony in gross. Id. Courts typically ordered alimony in gross
where the payor spouse was regularly intoxicated, was generally delinquent in
paying bills, refused to work, or worked in a hazardous occupation that might
make him unable to earn income later. Id. Thus, alimony in gross is an alternative to periodic payments, not an addition to them. Overton, 287 N.E.2d at 51.
49. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, A Theory for a "Just"Division of Marital
Propertyin Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165, 167-71 (1976) (discussing the inequities of property distribution under common law title); Symposium on the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act, 18 S.D. L. REv. 531, 531-37 (1973) (discussing
the need for a more equitable approach to property distribution in divorce).
50. See Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 424 (stating that when parties walked
away with only property to which they held title under common law title, the
housewife took nothing); Joan Pennington, The Economic Implications of Divorce for Older Women, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 488 (1989). Historically, women's economic dependence on men led to disastrous results for women in
divorce because the divorce cut off the women's economic resources. Id. See
also Marsha R. Shelburn & Randall M. Chastain, CareerAssets and the Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property,38 S.C. L. REV. 755, 759-60 (1987). Husbands' traditional roles enabled them to build up both tangible assets and career
assets, while the traditional housewife received no such opportunities. Id.
51. See Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 424 (stating that husbands walked away
with most property, since they held title).
52. Id.
53. See generally Smith, supra note 16, at 696-97 (stating that traditional
marital roles emphasized the husband's economic contributions when distributing property and awarding alimony to the detriment of a housewife).
54. Id. The common law system generally failed to account for the past
contributions as homemaker when deciding property interests upon divorce. Id.
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2. Community Property
The inequities arising from the common law title system of
property distribution led some states to adopt the community property scheme.5 5 Modern community property systems provide the
foundation for recognizing spouses as equal legal economic partners.56 Under this partnership theory, all assets acquired during
the marriage are shared by the marital "community. '57 Thus, when
a marriage dissolves, each spouse has a legal claim to all property
acquired during the marital partnership, regardless of who holds
title.

58

The community property system actually creates a property interest in both spouses during the marriage.5 9 Community property,
therefore, is under the joint control of both spouses. 60 Either
spouse, acting alone, is generally entitled to manage and control
Further, the system failed to recognize the spouse's forbearance of outside earnings opportunities. See Shelburn & Chastain, supra note 50, at 760 (discussing
how the traditional role of housewife has prevented women from building careers). Ultimately, the spouse was left with only alimony to provide for her
support. See id. Unfortunately, alimony is usually modifiable by the other
spouse, and often is difficult to collect.
Reliance on alimony perpetuated the supported spouse's dependence. See
also, Patel, supra note 1, at 559. A court retained jurisdiction to modify alimony
subsequent to divorce. Id. Such modifications could result from a reduced ability of the payor to pay. Id. Alternatively, a payor might seek a reduction due to
a reduced need of the payee. Id. Thus, a spouse who attempted to become selfsupporting faced the possibility of an alimony reduction. Id. If the husband was
the principle titleholder of property acquired during the marriage, he retained
such property upon divorce. Id. Alimony was likely the means of balancing the
marital wealth between the parties upon divorce. Id. Thus an early alimony
termination or reduction resulted in extreme inequities to the ex-wife. Id.
55. Smith, supra note 16, at 698-703.
56. Id. at 698; Reppy, supra note 25, at 163.
57. Smith, supra note 16, at 698; Michelle Patterson, Comment, What's
Yours is Mine and What's Mine is Mine: The C7assificationof the Home Upon
Dissolution,28 UCLA L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1981). See generally Weitzman, supra
note 28, at 1199 (stating that community property laws in California treat marriage like a partnership, treating spouses as equal owners of property).
58. See Smith, supra note 16, at 698; Patterson, supra note 57, at 1366.
59. See Note, Family Law: Ought a ProfessionalDegree be Divisible as
Property Upon Divorce, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 523 (1981) (describing a
community property system as one in which both spouses immediately obtain
ownership rights in property acquired during a marriage).
60. Rheinstein, supra note 9, at 422-23. Additionally, most state statutes
provide a comprehensive list of transactions that require joint participation. Id.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1974). Washington's law provides that both
spouses must join in the purchase or sale of community real estate, devising or
bequeathing property by will, gifting community property, create a security interest in community goods, furnishings, or appliances, encumber community assets, including real estate or business interests where both spouses participate
in the management. Id.
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one-half of the community property during the marriage. 6 1 Thus, a
spouse cannot easily transfer property out of the marital partnership to prevent its distribution to the other spouse in anticipation of
62
divorce.
However, property brought to the marriage by an individual
spouse, and property acquired by gift or inheritance remain outside
the marital domain as separate property. 63 Upon divorce, the court
first divides property into either community property or separate
property." Generally, the court distributes separate property to
65
the titleholding spouse before it distributes community property.
Then in some jurisdictions, such as California, the court must divide
community property equally between the spouses according to statute on a fifty-fifty basis. 66 In other jurisdictions, such as Texas, the
court has more discretion over property distribution. 67 There the
court has the discretion to allocate community property and redistribute separate property as equity requires in its judicial discretion. 68 It is from these later jurisdictions that equitable distribution
dervied its theoretical foundation.
3. Equitable Distribution
Equitable distribution systems resulted from common law title
states adopting the equitable principles of community property systems.6 9 Forty-two jurisdictions adopted equitable distribution in response to a need to replace common law title and its glaring
inequities. 70 In creating equitable distribution, legislators borrowed
the partnership theory from the community property system 7 1 and
based their laws on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("Uni61. See supra note 56 for the Washington Marriage and Dissolution Act as
an example of a statute requiring joint decision making as to certain types of
community property.
62. See supra note 56 for an example of a statute requiring that spouses
jointly decide on numerous dispositions of community property, preventing any
one spouse from clandestinely disposing of community property.
63. See Smith, supra note 14, at 697-98; McKnight, supra note 40, at 194-95;
J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation,23 FAM. L.Q.
219, 220-21 (1989).
64. See Smith, supra note 14, at 698; Oldham, supra note 59, at 220-21.
65. Oldham, supra note 59, at 219.
66. Weitzman, supra note 26, at 1199 (discussing the California Family Law
Act, which requires that the court distribute community property equally between the spouses.)
67. Smith, supra note 14, at 720-22.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 696.
70. Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 147.
71. See Smith, supra note 14, at 697.
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form Act").72 Under an equitable distribution law, the objective is
to distribute property upon divorce in an equitable manner without
73
regard to who holds title.
Nevertheless, similar to community property systems, most equitable distribution systems recognize certain property as outside
the class of property subject to division. 74 Thus, prior to distribution, the court characterizes property as marital property or
nonmarital property. 75 Marital property is subject to division between the parties regardless of who holds title.76 Unlike a community property system, an equitable distribution system does not
purport to create property interests during marriage. 77 "Marital
property" is a classifying term used strictly for purposes of determining what property is divisible in the event of divorce. 78 Generally, property acquired during the marriage carries a presumption
79
of being marital property.
To overcome the presumption, property must fall within a specifically delineated category of non-marital property.8 0 Nonmarital
72. Prefatory Note, supra note 1, Prefatory Note, at 149. Eight states
adopted the Uniform Act completely. Id. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-311
to 25-339 (1976 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-113, §§ 14-10101 to 14-10-133 (1987 & Supp 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40,
101 - 802 (1989);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.010, §§ 403.110 to 403.350 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984
& supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.002 to 518.66 (West Supp. 1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 452.300 to 452.415 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-1-101 to 40-1-404, §§ 40-4-101 to 40-4-221 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.09.010 to 26.09.902 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
73. McKnight, supra note 42, at 194-97.
74. Id. at 194-95.
75. Id. at 201-206.
76. Id. at 194; Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7, 503.
77. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (Ill. 1978) (stating that
equitable distribution only resolves property division pursuant to divorce, and
does not effect ownership to property during the marriage).
78. Id.
79. Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7, at para. 503(b). Paragraph 503(b)
provides:
(b) For purposes of distribution of property pursuant to this Section, all
property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage, including non-marital property transferred into some form of co-ownership
between the spouses, is presumed to be marital property, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of coownership such as joint tenancy, tenants in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property. The presumption of marital property is
overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed
in subsection (a) of this Section.
Id.
80. McKnight, supra note 42, at 205. See Illinois Dissolution Act, supra
note 7, at para. 503(a). The Dissolution Act provides:
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property is property owned outside the marital partnership.8 ' Generally, it consists of property acquired before the marriage, and
property acquired by gift or inheritance during the marriage.8 2 In

addition, it includes property acquired during the marriage in exchange for clearly traceable nonmarital property.8 3 A court distributes to each spouse his or her nonmarital property.8 4 Then the
court equitably divides marital property between the parties after
85
considering various factors that the statute prescribes.
The Uniform Act prescribes the factors that the court must
(a) For purposes of this Act, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following,
which is known as "nonmarital property":
(1) property acquired by gift, legacy or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, legacy or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) any judgment or property obtained by judgment awarded to a
spouse from the other spouse;
(6) property acquired before the marriage;
(7) the increase in value of property acquired by a method listed in
paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection irrespective of whether the
increase results from a contribution of marital property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of
reimbursement provided in subsection (c) of this Section; and
(8) income from property acquired by a method listed in paragraphs (1)
through (7) of this subsection if the income is not attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.
Id.
81. McKnight, supra note 42, at 201-205.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 204.
84. See Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7, at para. 503(c). The Illinois
Dissolution Act provides that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of marriage.. .the court shall assign each spouse's nonmarital property to that spouse."
Id.
85. See id. The Illinois Dissolution Act, which is based on the Uniform Act,
provides that the court:
(d) ... shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors, including:
(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and
nonmarital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of award-
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consider 8 6 when exercising its discretion to distribute property in
"just proportions. '8 7 A just distribution does not necessarily mandate an equal distribution.8 8 Although the Uniform Act requires a
court to weigh both monetary and nonmonetary factors, it directs
the court not to emphasize the former over the latter.8 9 Thus,
homemaking services command consideration in a just property distribution.90 Similarly, the court must disregard nonfinancial marital misconduct. 91 The court's primary goal is to distribute marital
92
property to achieve the most equitable result.
ing the family home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to
the spouse having custody of the children;
(5) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either
party;
(6) any antenuptial agreement of the parties;
(7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the
parties;
(8) the custodial provisions for any children;
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of
capital assets and income; and
(11) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective
economic circumstances of the parties.
Id.
86. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238 (1987)
[hereinafter UNIF. ACT] The Uniform Act provides:

(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or disposition of property following a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal
separation by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, without
regard to marital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation
may, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both however and whenever acquired, and
whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In
making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party, any antenuptial agreement of the
parties, the age, health, station, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs
of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in
lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the
contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and as the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
Id.
87. See In re Marriage of Aschwanden, 411 N.E.2d 238, 240 (Ill. 1980) (stating that the Illinois Dissolution Act, which derived from the Uniform Act, does
not mandate an equal distribution of marital property).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 240 (stating that the Illinois Dissolution Act requires that the
court consider homemaker contributions in property distribution).
90. Id.
91. UNIF. ACT, supra note 86, at 238. See supra note 86 for the complete
text of the Uniform Act, § 307.
92. See Aschwanden, 411 N.E.2d at 242.
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Although nonmonetary factors command equal weight, the
Uniform Act still requires a court to give weight to monetary factors in determining a just distribution. 93 Thus, a court must consider financial misconduct, such as dissipation of the marital estate
by a spouse prior to dissolution.94 In addition, a court must consider
contributions made to the marital estate by a spouse.95 By considering monetary and nonrnonetary factors the court can best achieve
equitable results in property distribution and sever the marital
relationship.
The objective of equitable distribution is to sever the relationship and put the parties in a position of independence to allow them
to begin anew. 96 Justice Perlin of the Illinois Appellate Court
97
clearly stated this sentiment in 1979 in In re Marriage of Lee:
The courts should seek a high degree of finality so that the parties can
plan their future with some certainty ....

Property division and

spousal support should be considered together in attempting to put the
two parties in
98 a position so that they leave the marriage in a self-sufficient status.
Thus, the notion that the court should award temporary maintenance only when the property distribution is inadequate to provide
for a spouse's needs furthers the objective espoused in Lee. 99
The effect of the legislature's objective of achieving equitable
results is most dramatically illustrated in the situation where one
spouse is a homemaker.1 00 The contributions of a homemaker, who
does not work outside the home, are to be considered in the same
manner as monetary contributions of the supporting spouse in
property division.10 1 In this sense, the court recognizes a homemaker as an economic contributor whose contributions serve the
well-being of the family. 0 2 While the court does not assign a spe93. See supra note 86 for the complete text of Uniform Act, § 307.
94. Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7, at § 503(c). See supra note 82 for
the complete text of the Illinois Dissolution Act, § 503(c), which is based on the
Uniform Act, requiring the court to consider dissipation of marital assets in
property distribution.
95. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a complete explanation of
the factors the court considers in distributing property pursuant to divorce.
96. In re Marriage of Lee, 398 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); In re
Marriage of Slauson, 562 P.2d 604, 607 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
97. Lee, 398 N.E.2d at 133.
98. Id.
99. Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 149.
100. In re Marriage of Swiger, 531 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
101. In re Marriage of Aschwanden, 411 N.E.2d 238, 242 (Ill. 1980).
102. In re Marriage of Grove, 571 P.2d 477, 482, reh'g denied, 280 Or. 769 (Or.
1977). A court considers a homemaker as an economic contributor. Id. A homemaker is not merely a passive receiver of economic benefits provided by the
supporting spouse. Id. See also LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 323 (W. Va.
1983), overruled on other grounds by Butcher v. Butcher, 357 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va.
1987).
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cific value to homemaker contributions, it considers such factors as
the length of the marriage and the quality of services, and whether
10 3
the homemaker has been frugal, rather than extravagant.
In determining property distribution, a court may also consider
dissipation of the marital estate. 10 4 Dissipation is usually limited to
intentional diminution in, or destruction of, assets by a spouse after
the marriage breaks down. 10 5 Accidental destruction, 1°6 or business
losses, 10 7 are not considered dissipation.
In addition, a court may also consider negative contributions.1 08
Negative contributions include irresponsibility and extravagance in
life-style during the marriage. 10 9 Such extravagance serves to reduce the overall property available for distribution to the non-extravagant spouse. 110 In addition, the court considers discordant
behavior that is so disruptive as to be the primary cause of marital
discord."'
Further, because an equitable distribution system seeks finality
in dissolving a marriage, the court seeks to sever co-ownerships in
property and business relationships between the spouses. 112 Even
when both spouses are active in a business, the court may grant
purchase options to each of the spouses. 113 The option terms may
require a public sale if neither exercises the option in order to sever
the relationship. 114 Consistent with a partnership theory, an equitable distribution system seeks to distribute all assets of the marital
103. In re Marriage of Caldwell, 465 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
104. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 86, at 238; In re Marriage of Clark, 538 P.2d
145 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975); Scherzer v. Scherzer, 346 A.2d 434 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975).
105. In re Marriage of Sevon, 453 N.E.2d 866, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). "Dissipation of marital assets occurs when a spouse uses marital property for his or
her own benefit for a purpose unrelated to the marriage while the marriage is
breaking down." Id
106. In re Marriage of Click, 523 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
107. In re Marriage of Krause, 654 P.2d 963, 969 (Mont. 1982) (dividing a loss
from business property held by both spouses equally between the spouses).
108. In re Marriage of Clark, 538 P.2d 145, 147 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). The
appellate court held that the lower court properly considered the husband's
"profligate life style" and "negatively productive conduct" in distributing property. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Scherzer v. Scherzer, 346 A.2d 434, 436 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
A court can consider discordant behavior of a spouse in determining property
distribution. Id. Discordant behavior is conduct directed at the other spouse
that is so disruptive that it cannot be said to have contributed to a supporting
spouse's business success. Id. It is conduct that creates a generally disruptive
household environment. Id.
112. In re Marriage of Slauson, 562 P.2d 604, 607 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
113. In re Marriage of Banach, 489 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
114. Id.
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partnership, including a business interest, and terminate the
relationship.
II.

BUSINESS GOODWILL AS MARITAL PROPERTY

Sometimes marital or community property includes a business

interest created or acquired during the marriage.1 1 5

Consistent

with a partnership theory, courts typically characterize the business
116
interest as marital or community property subject to distribution.

Thus, regardless of who acquired the business interest, both spouses
have an equitable claim to its value in divorce. 1 1 7 In addition, a
court routinely distributes a business to the spouse who is actively
involved in its operations. 1 18
In so doing, it resembles a forced
buyout of a partnership interest. 11 9 The nonparticipating spouse
thereby receives payment in the form of money or other offsetting
120
marital property.
Typically, the value assigned to the business interest derives

from generally accepted business valuation methods. 121 Business
appraisal experts commonly apply such methods for purposes of es115. In re Marriage of White, 424 N.E.2d 421, 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); In re
Marriage of Leon, 399 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of
Lee, 398 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 260
(N.J. 1975).
116. White, 424 N.E.2d at 423; Leon, 399 N.E.2d at 1009; Stern, 331 A.2d at
260. See also Olsher v. Olsher, 397 N.E.2d 488, 493-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating
that while a closely held corporation is not marketable, it has value and is subject to distribution in divorce).
117. See generally UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A. 324 (1969). In a commercial partnership, all partners have a claim to all assets of the partnership
upon dissolution. Id. This is so regardless of the degree of direct nonmonetary
contribution, if any, each partner had in property acquisition. Id. Similarly,
equitable distribution and community property systems of divorce contemplate
a similar treatment of property distribution pursuant to divorce. See Prefatory
Note, supra note 1, at 149.
118. See Stern, 331 A.2d at 260. See also Spearman v. Salminen, 379 N.W.2d
627 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)(stating that a court cannot confer a partnership interest on one not originally a partner).
119. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
The valuation of goodwill should be computed with care because in marital dissolution, one spouse is forced to buyout the other spouse's share. Id. It occurs at
a time not when the buyer desires to make the purchase for strategic business
reasons. Id. Instead it represents a forced purchase at a price that is judicially
determined. Id. Furthermore, the buyer is forced to purchase an intangible
asset with tangible property. Id.
120. Seiner v. Seiner, 552 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also Hammel v.
Hammel, 411 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (marital property awarded to one
spouse is offset by other property or future payments, generally).
121. Olsher v. Olsher, 397 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979)(stating that
while a closely held corporation may not be marketable, it has value nonetheless); Turgeon v. Turgeon, 460 A.2d 1260, 1265 (Conn. 1983) (stating that while
susceptible to being valued, the stock of a closely-held business cannot be valued using an inflexible formula); Lavene v. Lavene, 392 A.2d 621, 623-628 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (discussing various methods of caluing a closely-held
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tate tax, gift tax and buy/sell agreements, as well as divorce.1 22
Such accepted valuation methods include an element of value for
business goodwill.1 23 Goodwill is the intangible aspect of a business
enterprise relating to reputation and patronage.1 24 Elements of
goodwill include a business' name, proprietary product, location,
telephone number and trained work force.1 25 It is "nothing more
than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old
place. 1 26 Additionally, goodwill attaches to, and is inseparable
from, the business entity itself.127 Thus, goodwill has value only
28
insofar as it attaches to a continuing business.1
In order to value the goodwill element of a business, it is important to distinguish between "enterprise" and "personal" goodwill. 1 29 It is from this distinction that courts inconsistently treat

the goodwill of a professional practice in property distribution pursuant to divorce.' 30 Unlike personal goodwill, enterprise goodwill is
commonly marketable.' 3 1 Enterprise goodwill is associated with
the business entity.132 It includes elements of a business separate
and apart from the individual owners. 133 A proprietary product,
location, client base and work staff are examples of enterprise goodwill. 3 4 These elements produce goodwill by creating value in excess of the value of the individual assets.' 35 Further, these
elements are capable of being delivered to a buyer.' 36 Therefore, it
is relatively easy to place a value on enterprise goodwill.
37
In contrast, personal goodwill is associated with individuals.'
business); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 9-10 (N.J. 1983) (stating that the excess
earnings method is an appropriate valuation method for professional practice).
122. SHANNON PRATT, VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICES 7-8 (1986).
123. See In re Marriage of Kaplan, 490 N.E.2d 69, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)(stating that in valuing a commercial business, goodwill is added to book value);
Lord v. Lord, 424 A.2d 830 (Me. 1983) (holding that goodwill of an insurance
agency has value and is subject to distribution as marital property).
124. PRATT, supra note 122, at 393.
125. Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Mo. 1987)(en banc); PRATT,
supra note 122, at 188.
126. Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810).
127. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 433.
128. Id.
129. Michael W. Kalcheim & Norah M. Plante, Professional Goodwill in Divorce After Zells, 79 ILL. B.J. 624 (1991).
130. See infra notes 146-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
treatment of professional goodwill by various courts.
131. Id.
132. See PRATT, supra note 122, at 294-95.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 295.
136. See Kalcheim & Plante, supra note 129, at 624.
137. PRATT, supra note 122, at 294.
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It is that part of increased earning capacity that results from the
reputation, knowledge and skills of individual people.138 Accordingly, the goodwill of a service business, such as a professional practice, consists largely of personal goodwill. 139 Personal goodwill is
often thought not to be marketable. 140 Such a view arises from the
misconception that personal goodwill cannot be delivered to a buyer
141
due to its personal nature.
Unlike personal goodwill, courts commonly include enterprise
goodwill in valuing a business interest subject to property distribution in divorce. 142 Nevertheless, varying degrees of both personal
goodwill and enterprise goodwill combine to form the goodwill of
many businesses. 143 Such is the case with the goodwill of a professional practice, commonly called "professional goodwill."'1 44 However, due to the mistaken belief that professional goodwill is
composed solely of personal goodwill, courts are in disagreement
145
over its treatment in property distribution.
138. Id.
139. Kalchiem & Plante, supra note 129, at 624.
140. Id. But see PRATr, supra note 122, at 295. Methods do exist for the
transfer of personal goodwill. Id. While more difficult to transfer than enterprise goodwill, all or a portion of personal goodwill is capable of being transferred to an individual with qualifications comparable to the transferor. Id.
With the cooperation of both the transferor and transferee, clients' trust can be
eased over to the acquirer. Id. Generally, the transferor makes an announcement to the clients that the transferee has joined the practice. Id. After a
transition period during which clients learn to trust the new owner, the transferor retires or leaves. Id.
141. See infra notes 153-179 and accompanying text for a discussion of jurisdictions not recognizing professional goodwill as marital property due to its lack
of salability.
142. Note, Treating ProfessionalGoodwill as Marital Property in Equitable
DistributionStates, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 562 (June 1983).
143. See generally PRATT, supra note 122, at 294-95.
144. See Kacheim & Plante, supra note 129, at 624.
145. See generally Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 434-35 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc) (holding that goodwill of a professional practice is marital property subject to distribution); Eslami v. Eslami, No. 14183, 1991 WL 82546, at *7
(Conn.May 21, 1991) (stating that goodwill value exists in a medical practice
separate and apart from the individual tangible assets); Hurley v. Hurley, 615
P.2d 256, 259 (N.M. 1986) (stating that although not salable, goodwill value exists in a medical practice as long as the doctor maintains the practice); Golden v.
Golden, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that the goodwill
value of a sole professional practitioner is community property subject to distribution upon divorce); In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 906-07 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (holding that the goodwill value of a law practice is marital property).
See also Finn v. Finn, 658 S.W.2d 735, 741 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (acknowledging
that sometimes goodwill value exists in a law practice when the name includes
founding partners who are gone). But see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex.
1972) (professional goodwill is not a separate asset); Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d
545, 552-53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that goodwill of a sole practitioner
lawyer is not an element of value for property distribution); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 351, 354-55 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a marital
estate does not include the goodwill value of an interest in a law partnership);
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JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL
BEFORE ZELLS

The courts agree that, as a business interest, some value of a
professional

practice is

subject to distribution upon divorce.

146

While some courts include only the value of the practice's tangible
assets, 147 others also include goodwill value. 148 Jurisdictions recognizing professional practice goodwill in property distribution generally do so in reliance on economic principles and/or the divisibility

of professional goodwill. 149

In contrast, courts excluding profes-

sional goodwill do so largely on accounting-related principles that
refute divisibility. 150 Such courts opine that professional goodwill is
not divisible property' 5 1 and is not capable of valuation. 152 Therefore, these courts hold the professional goodwill is not property subject to distribution upon divorce.
This section discusses the two conflicting positions that the

courts take in their treatment of professional goodwill in divorce.
First, Part A discusses the minority view that professional goodwill
is not a divisible asset in divorce. Next, Part B discusses the major-

ity view that treats some portion of professional goodwill as distributable property in divorce.
Finally, Part C discusses the
inconsistent treatment that the various districts of the Illinois Appellate Court gave to professional goodwill in divorce prior to the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage of Zells.
Moebus v. Moebus, 529 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
the goodwill value of a medical practice is not marital property subject to
distribution).
146. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Attorney's Goodwill, 79 A.L.R. 4th
171, 174 (1990)(stating that courts recognize business interests as marital
property).
147. See Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545, 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (approving an approach to valuing the husband's law practice, which included work in
progress, but refusing to include an element of goodwill value); Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 353 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that since no goodwill value remains for division upon liquidation of a law partnership, there is no
goodwill value to distribute in marital dissolution).
148. See Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (holding
that professional practice goodwill is a marital asset subject to division in dissolution proceedings); Eslami v. Eslami, No. 14183, 1991 WL 82546, at *1 (Conn.
May 21, 1991) (holding that the lower court properly included a goodwill value
in the husband's medical practice.).
149. In re Marriage of Lopez, 331 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
150. See infra notes 153-179 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rationales espoused by courts that do not recognize professional goodwill as
marital property.
151. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
152. See Moebus v. Moebus, 529 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218, 223 (Kan. 1982); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309
N.W.2d 343, 354 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
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A.

Professional Goodwill as a Non-divisible Asset

A minority of courts reject the inclusion of professional goodwill in property distribution. 153 These courts assume that one cannot sell professional goodwill, and thus it is not distributable in
divorce.1 5 4 In addition, the minority view asserts that when a court
awards maintenance, it effectively considers professional goodwill
in the form of future earnings. 155 Thus, to consider it again in property distribution results in distributing it twice. 1 56 Finally, the minority view asserts that professional goodwill is too difficult 1to
57
value, thus precluding its consideration in property distribution.
Most courts that adopt the minority view rely primarily on an
assumption that one cannot sell professional goodwill.' 5 8 These
courts assert that goodwill disappears when a professional retires,
relocates, or dies.' 59 Moreover, some professionals cannot ethically
16 0
transfer professional goodwill under applicable codes of ethics.
In Holbrook v. Holbrook,16 1 a Wisconsin appellate court stressed
lack of salability of professional goodwill when it held that professional goodwill is not property divisible in divorce. 162 The Holbrook
court acknowledged that a professional practice may have goodwill
value in the form of reputation; however, such value does not create
153. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 146, at 174 (stating that a majority of
jurisdictions recognize professional goodwill as marital property).
154. See Note, Community Property-Valuationof Professional Goodwill, 11
N.M. L. REV. 435, 439 (1981).
155. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 354.
158. Id. at 354.
159. See Note, Community Property-Valuationof Professional Goodwill, 11
N.M. L. REV. 435, 439 (1981).
160. See, e.g., Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833, 841 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988). Some codes of ethics restrict transferability by prohibiting the use of
transferable corporate names. Id. Such codes require the inclusion in the practice's name the name of at least one senior practitioner. Id.
However, in 1990 the American Bar Association [hereinafter ABA]
changed its Model Code to permit the sale of goodwill in a law practice. Rita
Henley Jensen, Attorney Goodwill Increases, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 1.
The ABA fashioned its provision based on changes made in 1989 to California's
Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 38. The California Rules allow one to sell a
law practice, including goodwill, to another member of the Bar or another law
firm. Id. The ABA's change added a requirement that the seller must cease to
practice law in the relevant jurisdiction. Id. By December 1991, Michigan, Wisconsin and the Virgin Islands amended their codes of ethics to follow the ABA
Model Code. Id. Further, Missouri and Florida were considering similar
amendments. Id.
161. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
162. See Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 354. But see Jensen, supra note 160, at 38.
However, recently, Wisconsin amended its Code of Professional Ethics to allow
an attorney to sell a law practice, including goodwill. Id. This recent change
likely will effect the disposition of future cases involving facts similar to Holbrook in Wisconsin.
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a valuable property interest that can be sold or pledged by its owners.163 Rather, the value accrues to the holder in the form of in64
creased earnings.
Further, courts state that the increased earnings are already
considered in awarding maintenance and in the overall property
distribution. 165 Thus, to again consider increased earnings in goodwill results in double counting. 166 For example, in Beasley v. Beasley, 167 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that professional
goodwill relates only to future earnings. 168 Therefore, to value this
type of goodwill in property distribution would be the same as
awarding a lump sum alimony payment. 169 If a court additionally
awards alimony based on future earnings, a double charge on earnings results.170 However, rather than defining a valuation methodology that prevents double counting, the court merely excluded
goodwill from the property division.171
Moreover, courts excluding professional goodwill often assert
that its value is too difficult to ascertain. 72 Therefore, valuation is
163. See Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 354 (finding it disturbing to require a professional practitioner to compensate a spouse for an intangible asset at a value
that is judicially determined when a practitioner can not realize that value by
selling a practice). See also Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218, 223-24 (Kan. 1982).
In Powell, the Supreme Court of Kansas refused to consider the professional
goodwill of a medical practice as divisible upon divorce. Id. The court considered professional goodwill to be personal in nature. Id. at 223. Nothing remains
of it if a practioner dies or retires. Id. Thus, the court refused to include it in
property distribution pursuant to divorce. Id. at 223-24.
164. See Id. at 354-55. See also Moebus v. Moebus, 529 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In Moebus, a Florida appellate court expressly followed
Holbrook, bolstering its position by referring to the medical corporation's shareholder agreement. Id. The agreement specifically excluded goodwill from valuation in the event of a buyout. Id. Although acknowledging that the agreement
did not bind the wife, the court considered the principals' intentions of excluding goodwill in a sale amongst shareholders as support for its exclusion in the
divorce. Id.
165. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 355.
166. Id. In Holbrook, the court considered the husband's partnership in a
reputable law firm in dividing the community property. Id Additionally, his
salary was considered in awarding maintenance. Id. The court stated that considering the husband's earning capacity in this way was more direct and reasonable. Id.
167. Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545, 553 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Furthermore, because it is modifiable, alimony may be reduced if
the practitioner dies, retires, or suffers a business reversal. Id. In contrast, a
distribution of goodwill based on future earnings is fixed. Id. Thus, a practitioner receives a penalty if changes adversely effect future earnings beyond the
control of the practitioner. Id.
171. Id.
172. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
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too speculative to consider in property distribution. 173 The Holbrook court stressed that each of several members of a law firm
contribute to goodwill. 174 Thus, this court reasoned that it is pure
speculation to attempt to value one member's individual contribu175
tion to the practice.
In sum, a minority of courts exclude goodwill in property distribution based on the rigid notion that it is not property. 176 Their
reasoning is based primarily on a refusal to account for it as a separate asset.' 7 7 In addition, rather than define a valuation methodology that prevents double counting, courts completely exclude
goodwill value in property distribution. 7 8 In contrast, a majority of
the courts attempt to address the valuation issues, rather than com179
pletely exclude professional goodwill in property distribution.
B.

Professional Goodwill as a Divisible Asset

A majority of courts recognize professional goodwill value as
divisible property subject to distribution in divorce.' 80 Some of
these courts represent a middle ground, recognizing professional
goodwill only if the goodwill is related to aspects of the practice
separate from the individual practitioner.' 8 ' These courts recognize
173. Id. Nevertheless, however speculative it may seem, valuation of professional goodwill is no more speculative than damage awards in tort actions. See
Dina v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 884 (Ill. 1960) (allowing the spouse of an injured or killed person to recover for the loss of marital services); Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 835 (Kan. 1989) (allowing an award for the loss of enjoyment
of life). Further, the same uncertainties exist in valuing the stock of a small
closely held corporation. See generally Turgeon v. Turgeon, 460 A.2d 1260, 126465 (Conn. 1983). Yet, the courts routinely except valuations of goodwill in
closely held corporations in divorce. Id. The Turgeon court accepted a valuation
of the husband's solely owned machine shop, which included goodwill. Id. Similar to a professional practice, the major contribution to the business' growth in
Turgeon was the husband's know-how and skills. Id. See also Lavene v. Lavene,
392 A.2d 621, 624-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (discussing various possible
methods of valuing the goodwill of a closely held electronics company pursuant
to property division upon divorce).
174. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d at 354.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 153-175 and accompanying text for a discussion of rationales used by courts that do not recognize professional goodwill as marital
property.
177. See supra note 161 and accompanying text for an explanation of one
court's rationale for not treating professional goodwill as a separate asset.
178. See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the view that the recognition of professional goodwill as marital property results in the double counting of future earnings.
179. See infra notes 180-204 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rationales courts use to recognize professional goodwill as marital property.
180. McMahon, supra note 146, at 174; Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 434
(Mo. 1987) (en banc) (holding goodwill in a professional practice acquired during marriage is marital property).
181. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 429.
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that one can, and many do, sell certain professional practices at
amounts that include the value of goodwill.18 2 Other courts recognize goodwill value as a separate property interest strictly on equi83
table economic principles without regard to its actual salability
Finally, the majority view recognizes that future earnings are not
synonymous with goodwill value. 8 4 Thus, there is no double count85
ing problem.
The Missouri Supreme Court espoused a strict version of the
middle ground approach to recognizing professional goodwill in
Hanson v. Hanson. s 6 The Hanson court held that professional
goodwill is divisible in divorce if a market exists for its sale.' 8 7 The
Hanson court stated that the existence of goodwill value requires
proof that other professionals will pay for the goodwill value.' 88
Evidence of such willingness might include a recent sale of a similarly situated practice, or an offer to purchase the subject practice.'8 9 Alternatively, other forms of acceptable proof consists of
expert testimony that goodwill exists in a similarly situated practice
in a similar geographical area or professional market. 19°
In contrast, many courts espouse a more liberal approach and
do not require actual proof of an existing market as a prerequisite
to divisibility.' 9 ' Such courts recognize that ethics prohibit the sale
of goodwill in some professions. 192 However, courts recognize that
professional goodwill is transferable in some settings, even though
it cannot ethically be sold.193 Such a transfer occurs, for example,
when law firms admit new partners whose names do not appear in
182. See Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 435 (excluding goodwill value of an oral surgery practice relying on evidence that such practices were commonly sold, but
without goodwill value). See also Eslami v. Eslami, No. 14183, 1991 WL 82546, at
*7 (Conn. May 21, 1991) (holding that the goodwill of a medical practice was
subject to valuation and distribution, but rejecting the notion that goodwill
could exist absent a consideration of the salability of the practice and the existence of a ready market).
183. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974) (stating that because professional goodwill inures value to its owner, it
must be recognized as divisible property upon divorce).
184. Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
185. Id.
186. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 434.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833, 841 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
192. See id. (stating that ethical considerations may prohibit the sale of goodwill in a law practice). But see Jensen, supra note 151, at 38 regarding recent
changes in the ABA Model Code of Ethics.
193. Prahinski,540 A.2d at 841.
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the firm name. 1 9 4 In such cases, the right to use the firm name is a
large part of the firm's goodwill value, and is clearly separable from
the individuals. 195 Moreover, the fact that new partners routinely
pay for admittance indicates that it has economic value., 96 Therefore, equity requires consideration of this goodwill based on purely
economic principles.
In marital dissolution, the court's concern is primarily to effect
an equitable economic distribution. 197 For example, a California
appellate court in In re Marriage of Lopez 198 stated that "the parties are primarily concerned with the existence, value and consequences of the 'goodwill' of a professional business in an economic
sense, as distinguished from legal or accounting concepts."' 199 Thus,
as long as goodwill exists, it is divisible. 200 It is the purpose for
valuation of property that controls the recognition of professional
goodwill, and not its property characteristics. 20 1 Therefore, after
the court establishes that goodwill exists in a particular practice,
the only remaining issue is one of how much value to assign to it.
In sum, jurisdictions that recognize professional goodwill in
property distribution do so largely on equitable economic principles. 20 2 Such principles are consistent with the partnership theory
upon which community property and equitable distribution systems
are based. 20 3 Before Zells, Illinois inconsistently applied these prin20 4
ciples to professional goodwill.
194. Id. When a law firm admits new partners, it transfers goodwill. Id. In
such situations, professional goodwill often attaches to the firm name, which is
separable from the individual partners in the firm. Id. In fact, the firm name
may bear the name of partners who died long ago. Id.
195. Id.
196. See generally id.
197. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974). The effect of the purpose for the valuation on the value of goodwill is
apparent. Id. If the purpose for valuation is the liquidation of a practice, goodwill may have a value of zero. Id. Since goodwill has value only when attached
to a continuing business, goodwill terminates with the liquidation of the business. Id. However, valuation pursuant to divorce contemplates the continuation
of the professional spouse in the practice. Id. Therefore, goodwill value remains
the same after divorce as it did during the marriage and should be divided. Id.
202. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text for an explanation of
economic principles supporting the recognition of professional goodwill as marital property.
203. See supra notes 55-114 and accompanying text for an explanation of
community property and equitable distribution systems of property
distribution.
204. See infra notes 205-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
treatment by Illinois courts of professional goodwill in property distribution
prior to Zells.
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Professional Goodwill in Illinois Before
In re Marriageof Zells

Prior to In re Marriageof Zells, the various districts of the Illinois Appellate Court were split in their treatment of professional
goodwill in marital dissolution. 205 The First District Appellate
Court issued several inconsistent judgments. 20 6 In In re Marriage
of Wilder,20 7 the court stated that goodwill represents the general
ability to generate income. 208 The Wilder court noted that goodwill
is considered in determining an equitable distribution of property
under the Illinois Dissolution Act.20 9 Therefore, the court reasoned
that property distribution already accounts for goodwill in the form
of income generating ability, and no separate valuation of goodwill
210
is necessary.
However, two years later, the First District remanded in In re
Marriageof Davis,211 for a redetermination of the value of the hus21 2
band's law practice after originally failing to include goodwill.
The Davis court stated that although valuation of the practice "'is
not an exact science', this does not mean that such entities are incapable of being appropriately [valued]. ' 213 Further, the Davis court
stated that valuation of the practice is essential to the achievement
2 14
of fair and equitable results.
Subsequent to Wilder and Davis, the First District Appellate
Court addressed the issue of valuation methodology, rather than
the issue of the divisibility of professional goodwill. 2 15 In In re
205. See, e.g., Michael W. Kalcheim, Problems in Valuing ProfessionalGoodwill in Divorce Proceedings,78 ILL. B.J. 80, 84 (1990) (discussing the conflicting
views of the Illinois appellate courts prior to Zells).
206. See In re Head v. Head, 523 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988) (rejecting only the particular valuation methodology applied, but not the inclusion
of professional goodwill as marital property); In re Marriage of Davis, 476
N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985) (recognizing professional goodwill as
marital property); In re Marriage of Wilder, 461 N.E.2d 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1983) (holding professional goodwill is not marital property).
207. In re Marriage of Wilder, 461 N.E.2d 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983).
208. Id. at 454.
209. Id. In determining an equitable property distribution, the Illinois Dissolution Act requires the court to consider the "relevant economic circumstances
of each spouse... [the] occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability [and] the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future
acquisition of capital assets and income." See Illinois Dissolution Act, supra
note 7, 503(d). See supra note 85 for the complete text of the Illinois Dissolution Act.
210. Wilder, 461 N.E.2d at 454.
211. In re Marriage of Davis, 476 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1140.
214. Id. at 1141.
215. In re Head v. Head, 523 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
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Head v. Head,216 the court rejected a method that included future
earnings in its valuation of professional goodwill. 217 It appears that
in reviewing the lower court, the Head court solely addressed the
question of whether the particular valuation methodology applied
by the lower court was appropriate. 218 Thus, the court implied that,
properly valued, professional goodwill may be divisible as marital
219
property.
The Second District Appellate Court in In re Marriage of
Leon 220 held that the goodwill of an insurance sole proprietorship
was marital property and subject to distribution. 221 In so doing, the
222
court analogized the proprietorship to a medical or law practice.
The court noted that the weight of authority in other states supported the proposition that the goodwill of such practices consti2 23
tuted marital property.
However, within days of each other, the Third and Fourth Dis216. Id.
217. See id. at 19-20 (rejecting the inclusion of a stream of future earnings in
professional goodwill valuation).
218. See id. at 20 (stating that the valuation method was erroneous because it
included projected future income).
219. Id. See also In re Marriage of Foley, 516 N.E.2d 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1987). The implication that valuation was the only real issue in Head is
clarified by comparing it to In re Marriage of Foley, a First District Appellate
Court case involving the goodwill of a manufacturing business. Id. The Foley
court noted that the existence of goodwill depends on the particular facts and
circumstances, rather than on the type of business in question. Id. at 458. The
husband's expert asserted that the husband's electronic wire harness manufacturing business did not have goodwill. Id. at 458-59. The expert's conclusion
derived from facts peculiar to that particular business. Id. The court agreed
after finding that the wife's expert lacked credibility. Id. Further, her expert
erroneously applied an inappropriate valuation methodology. Id. Thus, the
court's objection was on valuation methodology, rather than on the correctness
of considering goodwill at all. Id. Therefore, one can fairly imply that, absent a
definitive statement to the contrary, the same court's objection to valuation
methodology in Head was not a rejection of professional goodwill as marital
property per se; rather, the First District Appellate Court objected to the erroneous valuation of an asset, whose value affected an equitable distribution of
marital property.
220. In re Marriage of Leon, 399 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1980).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. In re Marriage of Rubinstein, 495 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1986). Six years after Leon, the Second District Appellate Court reaffirmed its previous position that professional goodwill is subject to property distribution in Rubinstein. Rubinstein, 495 N.E.2d at 663. In so doing, the court
criticized the inconsistent treatment of the matter by the First District Appellate Court. Id. In addition, the Rubinstein court stated that an equitable property distribution required consideration of professional goodwill. Id. It stated
that "to ignore the intangible asset of goodwill could result in undervaluing the
practice... and thereby lead to an inequitable distribution of the property." Id.
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tricts issued contradicting opinions. 224 The Third District Appellate
Court in In re Marriageof Courtright225 refused to consider professional goodwill in property distribution. 226 The court agreed with
the holding in Wilder that goodwill is equivalent to income-producing ability, and is thus already considered as a factor in property
227
distribution under the Illinois Dissolution Act.
However, in In re Marriageof Stone,228 the Fourth District Appellate Court recognized professional goodwill and clearly articu229
lated the issues that were brushed over by the other districts.
First, the Stone court clearly asserted that a professional practice is
a business interest, the value of which is included in property distribution.2 30 The court acknowledged the hesitancy of some Illinois
courts to recognize professional goodwill for fear of double counting
future earnings.231 However, the court clearly stated that professional goodwill is not synonymous with future earnings. 232 Rather,
professional goodwill represents a potential for earnings in excess of
normal earnings.233 Further, regardless of its intangible nature, it
has real value to the spouse who owns the goodwill, both during and
after the marriage. 234 Thus, to ignore goodwill in property distribution would yield inequitable results. 235 Furthermore, the Stone
court noted that the trend in Illinois is to recognize professional
goodwill in property distribution pursuant to divorce. 236 However,
it also acknowledged that the Illinois courts failed to clearly establish guidelines for its valuation. 237 Thus, valuation methodology
238
was at the crux of the controversy.
Finally, the Fifth District Appellate Court followed the holding
of Leon in deciding In re Marriageof White,239 and remanded the
224. See In re Marriage of Courtwright, 507 N.E.2d 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d. Dist.
1987) (holding that professional goodwill is not marital property); In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987) (holding that professional goodwill is marital property).
225. Courtright,507 N.E.2d at 894-95.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 894.
228. In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 906-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1987).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 906-07.
231. Id. at 907.

232. Id.
233.
234.
235.
236.

In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 907.

237. Id.
238. In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987).
239. In re Marriage of White, 424 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
1981).
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case merely for a determination of the value of a professional dental
corporation. 240 The White court noted that there were no public
policy or economic reasons for ignoring professional goodwill in
property distribution. 24 1 A court can offset the value of professional goodwill distributed to the professional spouse with marital
property, or installment payments, to the nonprofessional
spouse.2 42 Thus, the relationship terminates and each spouse receives an equitable share of marital property. 243 Such an outcome
244
is consistent with the legislative intent of the Dissolution Act.
In commenting on the inconsistencies among the various districts of the Illinois Appellate Court, the Stone court explained that
the real issue in the controversy over whether to recognize professional goodwill in property distribution is valuation. 24 5 A clearly
established valuation methodology could eliminate the potential for
the double counting of future earnings.246 Thus, the major concern
of those courts not recognizing professional goodwill would be alleviated. 247 Further, accounting for its value, even if small in a particular case, recognizes economic reality. 248 Thus, courts can achieve
equitable results by distributing all things of value acquired during
the marriage, including professional goodwill.

IV. IN RE MARRIAGE OF ZELLS: A CASE STUDY
IN INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

The Supreme Court of Illinois ignored the opportunity in Zells
to address the valuation issue identified by the Stone court. 249
Rather, the Zells court rejected the recognition of professional
goodwill in property distribution altogether. 25 0 In so doing, the
court created formidable inequities in property distribution upon
divorce. Moreover, the Zells holding is unjustified 251 because it is
240. Id.
241. Id. at 423.
242. Id.
243. In re Marriage of White, 424 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist.
1981).
244. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative intent to seek finality in divorce.
245. Cf. In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1987) (pointing out that although the trend in Illinois is to recognize that professional goodwill is marital property, "no guidelines exist for a determination of
value thereof").
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944, 946 (Ill. 1991).
250. Id. at 946.
251. See infra notes 276-304 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
the Zells holding is unjustified.

176
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contrary to the mandates of the Illinois Dissolution Act. 252 In addi-

tion, it is contrary to the legislative intent behind the Act. 253 Moreover, the court erroneously concluded that distributing professional
goodwill results in a double counting of future earnings.254 Part A
of this section discusses the Ze~ls case, and Part B analyzes its unjustified holding.

A.

In re Marriageof Zells

In 1964, Myra and Martin Zells were married. 255 Mrs. Zells had
one year of college education, and no significant work experience
outside the home. 256 She was a homemaker and the primary caretaker of the couple's two children during the twenty year marriage. 257 Mr. Zells was an attorney in private practice during the
marriage, and he continued to practice law after the couple's separation in May 1983.258

After protracted proceedings, the court distributed property
valued at $194,000 to Mrs. Zells. 25 9 Mr. Zells received property valued at $224,000, including his law practice. 260 The trial court stated
that it attempted to divide the marital property equally; however,
the difference resulted primarily from the non-liquid nature of Mr.
Zells' law practice. 26 ' Both parties appealed the decision of the trial
court to the First District Appellate Court. 262 Among other matters, both parties challenged the value assigned to the law
26 3
practice.
Much of the valuation problem stemmed from the treatment of
252. See infra notes 280-283 and accompanying text discussing why the Zells
holding is contrary to the mandates of the Illinois Dissolution Act.
253. See infra notes 284-300 discussing why the Zells holding is contrary to
the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Illinois Dissolution Act.
254. See infra notes 301-304 and accompanying text discussing why including professional goodwill in property distribution does not result in a double
counting of future earnings.
255. In re Marriage of Zells, 554 N.E.2d 289, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 291.
260. In re Marriage of Zells, 554 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Zells maintenance of $250 per week, reviewable on June 1, 1988, and reviewable again in six years. Id.
261. Id. In addition, the trial court stated that a higher maintenance award
of $2,000-$3,000 per month was appropriate based on all considerations. Id.
However, after suffering a heart attack in March 1984, Mr. Zells worked fewer
hours. Id. Consequently, his earnings fell to $3,000 per month before taxes. Id.
Therefore, Mr. Zells had a reduced ability to pay maintenance. Id.
262. Id. at 291-92.
263. Id. at 292-93. Mr. Zells' valuation expert valued the tangible assets of
the law practice at $25,000. Id. at 290. In addition, the expert asserted that the
practice had no goodwill value. Id. The expert relied on the fact that fifty to
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two major contingent fee cases being handled by the law practice. 264
Due to their highly speculative nature, the trial court ordered that
they be separated from the value of the law practice, and divided
only if and when received. 265
However, the appellate court
266
disagreed.
Most of the court's opinion focused on the treatment of contingent fees.2 6 7 However, reflecting the view of a majority of jurisdictions nationwide, the court did recognize the value of professional
goodwill in property distribution. 268 The appellate court's major
concern was merely with the amount of value assigned to goodwill. 2 6 9 The court did not question the validity of considering prosixty percent of Mr. Zells' income came from two clients who would not remain

if Mr. Zells sold the practice. Id.
In contrast, Mrs. Zells' valuation expert assigned a value of $150,000 to the
law practice. Id. The expert assigned a range of value for goodwill of $66,000 to
$131,000. Id. The trial court valued the law practice at $92,010 identifying
$77,000 as goodwill. Id.
In addition to challenging the value of the law practice, both parties challenged the maintenance award of $250 per week. However, the appellate court
upheld that maintenance award. Id. The appellate court reasoned that the trial
court properly balanced Mr. Zells' reduced ability to pay against the expectancy
that Mrs. Zells would become self-supporting in arriving at the $250 per week
award. Id.
264. Id. at 293.
265. In re Marriage of Zells, 554 N.E.2d 289, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
266. Zells, 554 N.E.2d at 292-93. On appeal, the Zells court stated that contingent fees are not assets of a law practice at all. Id. at 293. Thus, the court held
that they are not assets of the marital estate and are not subject to property
distribution. Id. The court relied on three factors to support its conclusion that
contingent fees are not marital property. Id. First, an attorney has no legal
claim to the fees until there is a final disposition of the case. Id. at 292. Thus, it
does not represent an asset of the law practice. Id. Therefore, it follows that the
fees cannot be marital property. Id. Second, the amount is uncertain until there
is a final settlement, so their value cannot be ascertained. Id. at 292-93. Finally,
until cash is received, the value of the fees to the attorney is uncertain. Id. at
293.
However, the court noted that the exclusion of contingent fees from the
value of a law practice requires other adjustments to avoid an inequitable result
in property distribution. Id. The court noted that Mr. Zells' law practice incurred expenses attributable to the contingent fees. Id. The court reasoned that
these expenses were identical to any other investment made with an expectancy of future gains. Id. Moreover, the expenses incurred in the expectation of
realizing the contingent fees effectively reduced the value of the law practice.
Id. Therefore, the court required that Mrs. Zells receive credit for the amount
of the expenses in order to achieve an equitable result. Id. In this way, the
value of the law practice would not include future contingent earnings, as well
as expenses related to those future earnings. Id. This treatment of contingent
fees by the Zells court demonstrates its understanding that the value of the law
practice does not include future earnings.
267. See Zells, 554 N.E.2d at 292-93 (explaining why the court did not consider contingent fees to be marital property).
268. Id. at 293.
269. See id. at 292-93 (discussing why contingent fees are not properly included in the value of professional goodwill).
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fessional goodwill to be marital property. 270
Thus, whether
professional goodwill was subject to distribution was not an issue in
the case. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed.
The Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the issue of whether
professional goodwill is subject to valuation and distribution in divorce at all. 271 Then, in a two-page opinion, the court dismissed the
issue in a conclusory manner. 272 The court merely adopted the reasoning of the Courtrightcourt and concluded that valuing and distributing professional goodwill results in the double counting of
future earnings.27 3 The Zells court stated that goodwill, in the form
of future earnings, is properly considered merely as a factor in property distribution generally and in awarding maintenance.2 74 The
court held that professional goodwill is not itself subject to distribution in divorce.2 7 5 Unfortunately, such a cursory treatment of this
controversial issue will unfairly impact numerous nonprofessional
ex-spouses in the future.
B. An Analysis of Zells
The holding in Zells that professional goodwill cannot be marital property is not justified for three reasons. First, Section 503 of
the Illinois Dissolution Act 276 requires the distribution of all assets
acquired during the marriage, which includes business interests. 277
Second, nonrecognition of professional goodwill is in direct conflict
with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Illinois Dis270. See id. at 293 (remanding the case for a redetermination of the value of

the law practice solely to eliminate the contingent fees and related expenses
from the valuation).
271. In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944, 944-45 (Ill. 1991). In addition to
deciding whether to recognize professional goodwill as marital property, the
Zells court addressed the issue of whether contingent fee contracts are subject
to valuation and distribution as marital property. Id. The court agreed with the
Appellate Court's judgment and held that the contracts are not marital property. Id.
272. See id. at 945 (summarily concluding that professional goodwill is not
marital property). The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate
Court's reasoning for not recognizing contingent fee contracts as marital property. Id. In addition, the court stated that contingent fees cannot be divided in
divorce because Rule 5.4 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
a lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer. Id. The court cited a 1989 case in
which the Supreme Court of Illinois outlined the harms of a lawyer sharing fees
with a non-lawyer. Id. The Zells court then merely stated that the same concerns arise when contingent fee contracts are divided pursuant to divorce. Id.
273. Id. at 946.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Illinois Dissolution Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 101-08 (1991). See
supra note 80 for the complete text of the Illinois Dissolution Act, para. 50 3 (a).
277. Id.
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solution Act. 2 78 Third, properly valued, professional goodwill does
not result in a double counting of future earnings. 279 Thus, the
court in Zells erroneously concluded that professional goodwill cannot be valued and distributed pursuant to divorce.
First, section 503(a) of the Illinois Dissolution Act requires a
court to distribute all marital property. 28 0 Property acquired dur28
ing the marriage carries a presumption of being marital property. '
Courts routinely consider a business interest, including goodwill, to
be marital property. 282 Further, a professional practice is a business
interest. 283 Thus, it can properly be valued and classified as marital
property. Moreover, since goodwill is recognized as a part of the
value of a business interest, section 503 requires that the court distribute it upon divorce. Thus, by ignoring professional goodwill in
property distribution, the Zells court failed to comply with section
503 of the Illinois Dissolution Act.
Second, the most crucial reason for recognizing professional
goodwill as marital property arises from the legislative intent behind enacting the Illinois Dissolution Act. 284 First, the General Assembly intended to treat marriage like a partnership, and thus
correct the glaring inequities of prior law.2 85 Second, the General
Assembly intended to seek finality in divorce and thus avoid the
278. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388 (Ill. 1978). The
Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Dissolution Act, § 503, to provide for an
equitable distribution of property upon divorce. Id.
279. See infra notes 318-321 and accompanying text for an explanation of
why the recognition of professional goodwill does not result in the double
counting of future earnings.
280. Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7, para. 503(c). See supra note 80 for
the text of the Illinois Dissolution Act, § 503(a) requiring a court to treat all
property acquired during the marriage as marital property.
281. Illinois Dissolution Act, supra note 7, at para. 503. See also supra note
79 for the text of Illinois Dissolution Act, 503(b), stating that property acquired during the marriage carries a presumption of being marital property.
Additionally, 503(a)(7) includes, as property subject to distribution, the increase in value of property acquired during the marriage. Illinois Dissolution
Act, supra note 7, at para. 503(a)(7). Such increase in value is divisible "irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or otherwise." Id.
(Emphasis added.)
282. See supra note 6 for cases that stand for the proposition that business
interests are distributable as property pursuant to divorce.
283. See PRAITT, supra note 122, at 280 (stating that valuing a professional
practice is no different than valuing any other small business).
284. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative intent behind enacting the Illinois Dissolution Act.
285. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E. 2d 1382, 1388 (Ill. 1978). See also
supra note 71 and accompanying text supporting the proposition that equitable
distribution treats marriage like a partnership.
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payment of maintenance. 28 6 By refusing to recognize professional
goodwill in property distribution, the Zells court contradicted these
goals.
The General Assembly intended primarily to treat marriage
like a partnership. 28 7 In so doing, the legislature intended the
courts to distribute all property of the marital partnership in a manner similar to partnership dissolution. 28 8 Thus, each spouse has an
equal claim to assets acquired during the marriage. 28 9 The underlying legislative intent is to recognize each spouse's claim to marital
assets regardless of who made direct contributions to specific assets
29°
and who holds title.
Irrespective of which spouse owns the professional goodwill,
both spouses invested in its creation.291 The investment required
the expenditure of both tangible and intangible assets of the marriage.292 The tangible assets expended may include funds to set up
an office, to buy into a partnership, or to provide continuing education.293 The marital unit also invested in the business by foregoing
the benefits of alternative employment opportunities. Moreover, by
investing marital assets in the professional practice, the spouses
forego alternative investments that might otherwise be divisible in
divorce.
In addition to the tangible investments, the spouses invest significant intangible assets in the professional practice. For example,
spouses allocate family responsibilities to accommodate the professional spouse's required time commitments. Further, they may
forego leisure time together. The spouse not involved in the professional practice may sacrifice by spending more time alone. Finally,
certain related professional activities might require that the
uninvolved spouse participate as escort or host(ess). These intangible investments contribute to the creation of a professional practice.
Accordingly, the risks and rewards of the investment of tangible and intangible assets of the marital unit require the agreement
and cooperation of the parties as a partnership. Such investments
represent a joint decision to pursue goals of the marital partnership.
286. In re Marriage of Lee, 398 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). See also
supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text stating that the legislature intended to
seek finality in divorce.
287. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
equitable distribution treats marriage like a partnership.
288. See Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 147-49; Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,
376 N.E. 2d 1382, 1388 (Ill. 1978).
289. In re Marriage of Lee, 398 N.E. 2d 132-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
290. Id.
291. See In re Marriage of Davis, 476 N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
292. See generally Cheryl E. Hader, Marriage in New York: An Economic
Partnership?,9 PACE L. REV. 91, 108 (1989).
293. See generally id.
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While these elements of investment are difficult to track and weigh,
294
they are contributions nonetheless.
Furthermore, a spouse involved in a professional practice receives the benefit of professional goodwill after divorce no differently than during the marriage. 295 As a result, if a court ignores
goodwill in property distribution, it allows the professional spouse
to walk away with the entire investment. This result is in direct
contradiction to the legislative intent of equitably distributing all
things of value acquired during the marriage under a partnership
296
theory.
The holding in Zells also directly contradicts the legislative intent of seeking finality in divorce. 297 The Zells court stated that
professional goodwill, in the form of future earnings, is properly
considered in setting maintenance. 298 However, properly valued,
professional goodwill does not include future earnings. Moreover,
the objective of equitable property distribution is to avoid the necessity of awarding maintenance. 299 The goal is to terminate the relationship so that the parties may begin anew.300 An award of
modifiable maintenance prevents the parties from severing their
ties and thus contradicts the legislative intent of seeking finality.
Therefore, the holding in Zells contradicts both the legislative intent of treating marriage like a partnership and of achieving finality
in divorce.
Finally, the Zells court erroneously concluded that distributing
professional goodwill results in the double counting of future earnings. Numerous courts recognize that professional goodwill is not
synonymous with future earnings.30 1 The expectation of future
earnings may support a finding that goodwill exists. 30 2 However,
294. See generally In re Marriage of Caldwell, 465 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984) (stating that the court must consider even the noneconomic contributions
of a homemaker as contributions to marital property).
295. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
296. See generally Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388 (Ill. 1978)
(stating that the legislature enacted the Illinois Dissolution Act to provide for
equitable treatment in property pursuant to divorce).
297. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text for a discussion supporting the proposition that the legislature enacted the Illinois Dissolution Act to
achieve finality in divorce.
298. In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944, 946 (Ill. 1991).
299. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text explaining that one objective of a system of equitable distribution is to award maintenance only when
there is a real need.
300. In re Marriage of Lee, 398 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
301. Molloy v. Molloy, 761 P.2d 138, 141 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage
of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); In re Marriage of Stone, 507
N.E.2d 900, 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833, 841
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), affd, 582 A.2d 784 (Md. 1990); Dugan v. Dugan, 457
A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1983).
302. Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
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future earnings do not play a part in its valuation. 30 3 The valuation
of goodwill derives from evidence of past earnings in excess of the
earnings of an equivalent salaried practitioner, plus a normal return on the investment in tangible assets of the practice. 30 4 Therefore, the holding in Zells that professional goodwill cannot be
marital property subject to distribution cannot be justified.
V.

A PROPOSAL FOR THE VALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL
GOODWILL IN PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION

The Illinois General Assembly should amend the Illinois Dissolution Act to require courts to recognize professional goodwill as
marital property. 305 The General Assembly should also adopt a valuation methodology applicable to the valuation of professional
goodwill.3° 6 The treatment of professional goodwill as marital
property, once properly valued, provides equitable results in prop307
erty distribution.
A.

Illinois Should Recognize ProfessionalGoodwill
as Marital Property

In property division pursuant to marital dissolution, the court's
30 8
concern is primarily to effect an equitable economic distribution.
Thus, as long as goodwill exists, it should be treated as marital property subject to division.3 0 9 Once the court establishes that goodwill
exists in a particular professional practice, the only remaining issue
is one of how much value to assign to it. If there is a ready market
for the sale of goodwill for the particular profession, the court
should refer to market comparables to value professional goodwill.
Nevertheless, when no ready market exists for goodwill, the
court must determine goodwill value from sources other than comparable sales.310 The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in Hurley v.
303. Id.
304. Stone, 507 N.E.2d at 908. See infra notes 322-339 and accompanying text
for a complete explanation of how to value professional goodwill.
305. See supra notes 276-304 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
reasons that support the proposition that courts should recognize professional
goodwill as marital property.
306. See supra notes 237-238 and accompanying text for one court's assertion
that there is a need to define a methodology for valuing professional goodwill.
307. See supra notes 284-296 and accompanying text for a discussion supporting the proposition that courts must recognize professional goodwill as marital
property in order to achieve equitable results in property distribution.
308. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
309. Id.
310. See, e.g., id. In Lopez, the court acknowledged "that 'professional good" Id. at 67. Howwill' may be elusive, intangible, [and] difficult to [value] ..
ever, the difficulty in valuation is no reason to ignore it. Id. See also, Stern v.
Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J. 1975). New Jersey courts agree that even though
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Hurley,311 recognized that no definitive method for valuation exists. 3 12 Therefore, valuation depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. 313 By its very nature, a sole proprietorship
may possess little or no divisible goodwill value. 314 In contrast, a
larger professional firm may possess substantial divisible goodwill
value.3 15 Nevertheless, a court should not ignore professional goodwill in property distribution merely because goodwill in a particular
professional practice has relatively little value. 316 Further, the fact
that it is difficult to value does not preclude a court from taking
317
professional goodwill into account.
Moreover, proper application of valuation methodology avoids
the concern about the double counting of future earnings. 318 The
Lopez court stated that future earnings are merely considered as
one factor in determining whether goodwill exists.319 However, the
court is not to consider future earnings in its determination of the
value of goodwill. 320 Thus, even if the court considers future earn321
ings in setting maintenance, there is no risk of double counting.
Accordingly, the Illinois Dissolution Act should require that
courts treat professional goodwill as marital property subject to division upon divorce. In addition, the statute should prescribe the
methodology for valuing professional goodwill in order to achieve
a law firm's goodwill is not salable, it has economic worth. Id. Further, valuation may be difficult when the practitioner does not intend to transfer the interest. Id. However, that fact does not preclude its valuation by acceptable
methods. Id.
311. Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256, 259 (N.M. 1980), overruled on other
grounds by Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 637 P.2d 564, 566 (N.M. 1981).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833, 841-43 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988) (holding that while professional goodwill may exist in some law practices,
there was no goodwill value in the sole practitioner husband's law practice)
affd, 582 A.2d 784 (Md. 1990).
315. See id. at 841 (pointing out that law firms bearing the names of deceased
partners may have goodwill value).
316. See Hurley v. Hurley, 615 P.2d 256, 259 (N.M. 1980) (stating that even
though not always salable, goodwill is not without some value), overruled on
other grounds by Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 637 P.2d 564, 566 (N.M. 1981).
317. Id.
318. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (Ca. Ct. App. 1974);
Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1983); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J.
1975); Hurley, 615 P.2d at 259. See also Prahinski,540 A.2d at 841 ("goodwill
reflects not simply a possibility of future earnings, but . . . [reflects] existing
circumstances").
319. Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
320. Id.
321. See Stern, 331 A.2d at 260 (noting that future earnings should not be
recognized as a separate item of property, but would be considered in ensuring
that a distribution is 'equitable' and to determine the amount of alimony
payments).
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equitable results. The following section discusses an appropriate
methodology.
B.

The Methodology for Valuing Professional Goodwill

The Illinois General Assembly should adopt a methodology for
valuing goodwill for purposes of property distribution pursuant to
divorce. Since the court should distribute professional goodwill
upon divorce, a prescribed valuation methodology provides objective criteria for the courts to apply in valuing it. Moreover, by prescribing a methodology uniquely designed for this purpose, the
General Assembly can insure that the courts will produce equitable
results in property distribution.
The General Assembly should adopt the valuation methodology suggested by the Stone court.322 As an element of this methodology, the legislature should also require that the court consider the
323
factors enumerated by the California Court of Appeals in Lopez.
These factors include:
the practitioner's age, health, past demonstrated earning power, professional reputation in the community as to his judgement, skill,
knowledge, his comparative professional success, and the nature and
duration of his business as a sole practitioner or as a member of a partnership or professional corporation to32which
his professional efforts
4
have made a proprietary contribution.
The General Assembly should mandate that courts consider these
factors, which will aid in accurately reflecting the value of
322. E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688, 693 (Del. 1983); Hanson v. Hanson, 738
S.W.2d 429, 435-36 (Mo. 1987); Dugan, 457 A.2d at 9-10; Hurley, 615 P.2d at 259.

See In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (describing
the capitalization of excess earnings approach as one appropriate method of valuing professional goodwill).

Valuation specialists recognize the capitalization of excess earnings approach for professional goodwill valuations in divorce proceedings. See PRATT,
supra note 122, at 305-08 (stating that the excess earnings approach is a method
accepted by numerous courts for valuing a professional practice). See also Rev.
Rul. 68-609, 1968-2, C.B. 327 (suggesting the capitalization of excess earnings
approach for valuing intangible assets of a business when no other method exists); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1, C.B. 237 (designating the method for valuing the
stock of a closely held corporation for estate and gift tax purposes). But see
104-05 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing denunciation of the method by the Internal Revenue Service because of the misapplication of the method, primarily due to the arbitrary rates of return used by people
applying the method).
323. Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68. See also PRATT, supra note 122, at 300-03
(stating that business valuation specialists should consider the Lopez factors in
valuing professional goodwill). The consideration of factors similar to those
enumerated in Lopez is akin to the Illinois Dissolution Act, 503, which requires that the court consider certain factors in property distribution. See
supra note 85 for a listing of the factors in 503(d) of the Illinois Dissolution
Act.
324. Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
SHANNON PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS,

Professional Goodwill
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goodwill. 325
There are three basic steps entailed in the valuation methodology that this Note proposes. First, the court should analyze past
earnings of the professional practice to determine whether the
practice has "excess earnings. '3 26 If excess earnings exist, step two
requires that the court determine an appropriate capitalization
rate. 327 Finally, step three requires that the court capitalize excess
earnings by multiplying the excess earnings derived in step one by
the capitalization rate determined in step two. 32 8 The result is the

value for professional goodwill.
In order for the court to determine if "excess earnings" exist,
the court must first ascertain what would be the normal earnings of
a professional with comparable experience, expertise, education,
age and hours worked in the same community. 329 Then, the court
should obtain the past five years' pre-tax earnings of the professional practice.3 3 0 The court then should compute a weighted average 3 3 1 of these earnings and compare the result with the norm for
the comparable employee. 332 If the weighted averaged earnings of
the practice exceed (1) the norm for the comparable employee plus
325. Id.
326. See PRATT, supra note 122, at 156-57 for a complete discussion of the
excess earnings method of valuation. See also In re Marriage of Stone, 507
N.E.2d 900, 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (describing the excess earnings method of
valuation for professional practices).
327. See PRATT, supra note 122, at 122 (defining the term, "capitalization
rate," as "a percentage rate by which a constant income stream is divided in
order to indicate a value").
328. Id. at 157; Stone, 507 N.E.2d at 908.
329. PRATT, supra note 122, at 303. There are numerous earnings surveys
available that provide comparable earnings of professionals in different geographical areas. Id.
330. Id. at 307. Five years of earnings history usually reveals trends, and
exposes extraordinary occurrences that are relevant to valuing goodwill.
331. Id. at 335. To "weigh" earnings, the court assigns each year's earnings a
weight factor, assigning the most recent year's earnings the most weight. Id. If
the court uses the five preceding years, the following results:
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

earnings:
earnings:
earnings:
earnings:
earnings:

$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$30,000
$35,000

Total

X
X
X
X
X

1
2
3
4
5
15

=
=
=
=

$ 20,000
$ 50,000
$ 90,000
$120,000
= $175,000
$455,000

Weighted Average = 455,000/15 = $30,333
See id.
332. Id. at 303. The court compares the professional practitioner's earnings
to those of a comparable practitioner to determine "success." Id. The "success"
of a professional is usually measured by earnings. Id. It is critical, however, that
the court compare practitioners that work comparable hours, serve a comparable number of clients or patients, and so forth. Id. The court must compare
earnings in light of these factors in order to determine whether the practi-
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(2) a return on investment from the tangible assets of the practice, 33 3 then the court determines that goodwill exists.
Once the court determines that goodwill exists, the excess
earnings serve as a basis for computing goodwill. 3 34 The court shall
determine the appropriate capitalization rate 335 to apply to these
excess earnings in order to arrive at a value for goodwill. 33 6 The
tioner's "success" results from working longer hours, or from professional goodwill. Id.
333. Id. at 156-63. A professional practitioner invests capital in tangible assets that are necessary for the operation of the practice. Id Such assets include
furniture, office equipment, specialized professional equipment, telephones,
leasehold improvements and the like. Id. The earnings of the practice provide a
return on the investment in these assets. Id. In contrast, employees are not
required to invest in these items because the employer provides them. Id. Thus,
the employee invests his or her capital and earns a return from alternative investments. Therefore, a return on capital invested in the tangible assets of the
practice must be first subtracted from earnings before a realistic comparison
can be made between the earnings of the practice and those of a comparable
employee. See id.
334. PRATT, supra note 122, at 307; In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900,
908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
335. See PRATT, supra note 122, at 121-42 (for a complete discussion of capitalization rates). Risk effects the capitalization rate. Id. at 128-29. Thus, characteristics increasing risk require an increase in the rate of return a buyer would
command. Id. Conversely, characteristics reducing risk require a reduction in
the required rate of return. Id For example, suppose Buyer wants to purchase
a business with a stream of income of $50,000 per year. Further, Buyer has two
available acquisition opportunities: A and B. Buyer's required rate of return for
a business with equal risk and equal return as A is 25%. Thus, one would say
Buyer's capitalization rate is 25%. Buyer capitalizes the income stream to arrive at the amount he is willing to pay. Thus, Buyer is willing to pay $200,000
($50,000/.25=$200,000) today for the right to receive $50,000 per year from A.
Now, assume that due to unique characteristics, the B business is a riskier
venture. There is less certainty that Buyer will actually collect the $50,000 each
year from B after the acquisition. Consequently, Buyer may decide that he
needs an increased return of 30% to compensate for the increased risk. Thus,
Buyer is only willing to pay $166,667 ($50,000/.30=$166,667) for B.
Further, assume that the seller of B offers to guarantee the $50,000 income
stream for the first two years, but not thereafter. The guarantee reduces
Buyer's risk. Therefore, Buyer may decide that his required rate of return on B
with a two year guarantee is 28%. Thus, Buyer is willing to pay $178,571
($50,000/.28 = $178,571) for business opportunity B with a two year income guarantee. The valuation of professional goodwill follows a similar process to the
foregoing. See id. at 305-16 (describing in detail an example of the valuation of a
professional practice).
336. Id. at 307-08. The capitalization rate effectively converts the excess
earnings into an amount of money that a willing and able buyer would pay up
front for the right to receive the excess earnings in the future. Id. at 300-01.
Because the purpose of the valuation is property distribution pursuant to divorce, the court does not contemplate an actual sale. Id. Thus, the court ignores
difficulties in, or ethical restrictions on actual salability of a particular professional practice. Id. The value of the practice on the date of dissolution is relevant only insofar as it provides the value of an asset divisible upon divorce. Id.
Further, the appropriate capitalization rate depends on the evidence in the
particular case. Id. In determining an appropriate capitalization rate, the court
should consider capitalization rates applicable to the valuation of other professions, and adjust for peculiarities of the subject profession. Id. at 307-08. Fur-
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capitalization rate is a percentage rate by which the court converts
excess earnings into a single value. 337 To determine the appropri-

ate capitalization rate, the court considers the characteristics of the
particular professional practice and the relative risks associated
with those characteristics. 338 The capitalization rate is then multiplied by the excess earnings to arrive at a value for professional
339
goodwill.
The foregoing valuation methodology furthers the legislative
intent behind the adoption of Section 503 of the Illinois Dissolution
Act of achieving equitable results in property distribution pursuant
to divorce. 340 A professional practice acquired during a marriage is
a valuable asset. 341 Under the partnership theory, that asset should
be valued and distributed as marital property. 342 This proposed valuation methodology accomplishes the legislative goal by providing a
means of valuing this important asset of the marriage in a reviewable, nonspeculative manner. 34 3 The acceptance by numerous
3 45
courts of this methodology 344 further supports its reliability.
ther, the court should consider the factors enumerated in Lopez. Id. at 301-03.
For example, the court should consider the nature and duration of the practice.
Id. In so doing, the court considers factors such as the type of client served, type
of service offered, number and tenure of employees, how fees are billed, and
how many other professionals offer the same service in the community. Id.
These factors impact the risk related to an investment in the particular practice, which risk the court must consider in determining a capitalization rate. Id.
For example, a practice may have a large number of tenured employees,
many of whom service a particular client. See Beasley v. Beasley, 518 A.2d 545,
552-53 (Pa. Super. 1986) (discussing the differences between a sole law practitioner and a law partnership). It is unlikely, in that situation, that a client will
be sensitive to the departure of a particular practioner. Id. Thus, there is little
risk of an adverse impact on the practice's ability to generate earnings from that
client. Id. In contrast, a client utilizing the services of a sole practioner may be
more sensitive to a transfer of the client's account to a new practitioner. Id.
Thus, this adversely effects the ability of a transferee of the practice to retain
the client and continue generating earnings therefrom. Id. Therefore, the court
should adjust the capitalization rate to reflect the impact that the number of
tenured employees has on the risk of retaining clients and retaining the earnings generated by them. PRArr, supra note 122, at 307-08.
337. See PRAT, supra note 122, at 122.
338. See id., at 301-03.
339. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1983).
340. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Illinois legislature's intent behind its adoption of the Illinois Dissolution Act.
341. See supra notes 180-204 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the important value of a professional practice.
342. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text explaining that the partnership theory of marriage contemplates the distribution of a professional practice
upon divorce.
343. See supra notes 322-339 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the valuation methodology proposed in this Note.
344. E.g., In re Marriage of Stone, 507 N.E.2d 900, 908 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 9-10 (N.J. 1983).
345. See id.

The John Marshall Law Review

VI.

[Vol. 26:147

CONCLUSION

Divorce reform in this country since 1974 reflects society's
changing views of marriage. 346 Historically, marriage reflected the
unequal legal and economic roles of spouses. 347 In contrast, society
views modern marriage as a partnership between legal equals.3 48
Consistent with this view, forty-nine states now have laws recognizing the legal equality of spouses by requiring an equitable distribution of property, including business interests, pursuant to
divorce. 349 However, the Illinois Supreme Court in Zells established a rule creating gross inequities when one such business interest includes the goodwill of a professional practice. 350 It is now time
for the Illinois General Assembly to amend section 503 of the Illinois Dissolution Act and correct this gross inequity in property distribution by recognizing the divisibility of professional goodwill and
establishing a proper valuation methodology.
Diane Green Smith

346. See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of society's changing view of marriage on divorce reform.
347. Id.
348. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of society's view of modern marriage as a partnership between equals.
349. See supra notes 1-2 for a listing of states that adopted equitable distribution laws.
350. See supra notes 276-304 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
inequities inherent in the holding in Zells.

